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THE COMMON LAW AND THE EVIDENCE CODE:
ARE THEY COMPATIBLE?
Neil Brooks*
The only direction I was given in preparing for this panel was 
that the title of the session would be “The Proposed Federal 
Evidence Code.” This gave me the freedom to pull from my files any 
one of a number of speeches that I have given in the past three or 
four years in which I have spoken in laudatory and glowing terms 
about how the Code reconciles the various interests of our 
procedural system and how it places the rules of evidence on a sound 
empirical basis. I have chosen instead, to speak about an aspect of 
the Code of which I have less confidence, but which at the end of the 
day might be the most far-reaching. This aspect relates to the issue 
of the nature and methodology of a Code; in particular, the 
methodology of the Evidence “Code” . This topic is of more general 
interest than other aspects of the Code, and it raises significant 
questions about the relationship between the civil and the common 
law that will eventually have to be confronted in all areas of the law. 
That Law Reform Commission of Canada is specifically required to 
address itself to this issue. The Commissioner’s statutory objects 
include the study of, “ the reflection in and by the law of the distinc­
tive concepts and institutions of the common law and civil law legal 
systems in Canada, and the reconciliation of differences and dis­
crepancies in the expression and application of the law arising out of 
differences in those concepts and institutions.” 1 A recurrent 
criticism of the Evidence Code in the common law regions of Canada 
has been that it is a “ Code” . Even those who would agree that the 
laws of evidence are in need of drastic reform resisted the notion that 
they ought to be codified. The concern accounting for this 
resistance, if not expressed, was always apparent: a Code is a civilian 
concept and, therefore, foreign to the common law, and could not, as 
lawyers were fond of analogizing, be grafted onto it. This argument 
was often taken to be so self evident that simply labelling the Code 
civilian was intended to end debate about its merits. Representative 
of the comments was one made by the Ontario Criminal Lawyer’s 
Association “ . . .  it would be far better to adapt our existing Statutes 
so as to improve them, rather than experimenting with a concept (a 
Code) foreign to our common law heritage.” 2 Unfortunately,
* Associate Professor of Law in the Faculty of Law at Osgood Hall, University of 
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1 Law Reform Commission Act, R.S.C., 1970 (1st Supp.), c.23, é.ll(b).
2 Letter to Mr. Attorney (Ron Basford), in Criminal Lawyer's Association News­
letter, vol. 2, issue 6. p. 5 (April 1977). See also Anderson, A Criticism o f  the Evi­
dence Code: Some Practical Considerations, 11 U.B.C. Law Rev. 163 (1976).
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because many common law lawyers use the word “civilian” as simply 
an emotive and pejorative term, referring generally to legal cultures 
dominated by an inquisitorial system in which the rights of the 
accused are jeopardized, or an all-embracing Code under which the 
law is rigid and unanalytical, it is difficult to extract from these 
criticisms a specific proposition that can be verified or refuted. My 
argument in this paper will, therefore, be general. I will argue that 
the concept or methodology of a Code of Evidence is not alien to the 
common law. While my arguments will be addressed to this question 
in particular, they relate to an even more general proposition: There 
is no reason why the same legislative enactment cannot be enacted in 
common law Canada and civil law Canada and be consistent, or at 
least not inimical to, the judicial methodologies of both systems.
Although this issue would appear to raise the notoriously diffi­
cult question of the differences between the common and civil law, 
this is a debate which I hope to avoid. I would not want my argument 
to be viewed as yet another attempt to inflict the corrupting effect of 
the common law upon Quebec Civil Law. ■' The issue can to some 
extent be fairly skirted because whatever the essential differences 
between the common and the civil law, the existence or nonexistence 
of a Code is a minor one.4 Although it might seem peculiar to 
speak of a common law system if all the law in that system were 
codified, nevertheless, it would still be necessary to distinguish, for 
example, the English legal system, even if codified, from the French 
system. Civil law and codified law are not synonymous terms. France 
and Germany were described as civil law countries before codifica­
tion took place, and today, Scotland and South Africa are properly 
referred to as civilian in some sense and they do not have Codes.5
3 See Baudouin, The Im pact o f  the Common Law on the Civilian System o f  Louisi­
ana and Quebec, in J. Dainow (ed.), The Role o f  Judicial Decisions and Doctrine 
in Civil Law and in M ixed Jurisdictions 1 (1973).
4 For a thorough examination of the difference see A.A. Ehrenzweig, Psychoana­
lytic Jurisprudence 109-141 (1971); see also Sawer, The Western Conception o f  
Law. in 2 International Encyclopedia of Comparative Law 1-26 (1975); but see 
A.T. Von Mehren, The Civil Law System: Cases and Materials fo r  the Compara­
tive Study o f  Law 3 (1957). Some comparativists argue that while it is not the fact 
of a Code alone that distinguishes the common law system from the civilian 
system, what does distinguish them is the underlying ideology of codification. 
And that this ideology is not abridged simply by the adoption of a Code in a com­
mon law jurisdiction:
An entirely different set of ideas and assumptions is associated with the 
California Civil Code, or with the Uniform Commercial Code as adopted in 
any American jurisdiction. Even though such codes may look very much like 
a French or German Code, they are not based on the same ideology, and 
they do not express anything like the same cultural reality.
J.H. Merryman, The Civil Law Tradition 33 (1969).
5 R.B. Schlesinger, Comparative Law: Cases - Text - Materials 234-5 (30 ed. 1970).
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Codification: A  Definition
In spite of the intensity and passion with which many common 
law lawyers inveigh against the notion of codification, there is 
surprisingly little common ground about what a Code is, and how it 
differs from a statute or other form of legislative enactment. Codifi­
cation, in its broadest sense, simply describes the reduction of the 
law to a written form. It is in this sense that common law lawyers 
often use the term. When Parliament passes a statute dealing with 
an area of law that was previously left entirely to decisional law, 
lawyers are apt to say that the law has been codified. Thus, the 
concept of codifying the law of Evidence has been criticized by some 
by comparing it to the “ codified” rules regulating drunken driving 
and the problems of interpretations that have arisen under that 
legislation. Used in this sense codification is not any different than 
any other form of legislative enactment. However, as a matter of 
convenience in usage, codification ought to be distinguished from 
both a revision of statutory law (which is an exercise undertaken 
periodically by the Federal and Provincial governments in an effort 
to rationalize present statutory law by renumbering it and occasion­
ally pruning out obsolete sections) and also a consolidation (which is 
an exercise of bringing together into one legislative enactment a 
number of legislative enactments that deal with the same subject 
area). The more difficult task, of course, is identifying the character­
istics which distinguish a Code from any other statutory enactment 
dealing with a specific area of law. When does an Evidence Act or a 
Criminal Act become an Evidence Code or Criminal Code?
Most commentators agree that in modern usage “Code” 
describes a legislative enactment that is comprehensive, systematic, 
pre-emptive and stated in terms of principles.” Professor Hawk- 
iand has briefly described the first three of these attributes:
6 See Donald, Codification in Common Law Systems, 47 Aust. L.J. 160 (1973); 
Scarman, Codification and Judge-Made Law: A Problem o f  Coexistence, 42 
Indiana L.J. 355, (1966-67); Lobingier, Codification, in 2 Encyclopedia o f  the 
Social Sciences 606, (1930); Lawson, A Common Law Lawyer Looks at Codifica­
tion 2 Inter-American Law Review 1 (1960); Bayitch, Codification in M odem  
Times, in A.N. Yiannopoulos (ed.), Civil Law in the M odem  World (1965); Good­
rich, Restatement and Codification, in Reppy (ed.), David Dudley Field: Centen­
ary Essays 241 (1949); R.B. Schlesinger, Comparative Law: Cases - Text - 
Materials 235 (3d ed. 1970). Some of the best writing on the concept of codifica­
tion in the common law is contained in the literature about the Uniform Com­
mercial Code, see for example, Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Causes and Cure, 70 
Yale L.J. 1037 (1961); Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence o f  the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 27 Stanford L. Rev. 621 (1975); Fanswaorth, A  Générai Sur- 
very o f  Article 3 and an Examination o f  Two Aspects o f  Codification, 44 Tex. L. 
Rev. 644 (1966); Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Methodology, \!962) U. 
III. L.F. 291.
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“ A ‘code’ is a pre-emptive, systematic, and comprehensive enactment of a 
whole field of law. It is pre-emptive in that it displaces all other law in its 
subject area save only that which the code excepts. It is systematic in that 
all of its parts, arranged in an orderly fashion and stated with a consistent 
terminology, form an interlocking, integrated body, revealing its own plan 
and containing its own methodology. It is comprehensive in that it is 
sufficiently inclusive and independent to enable it to be administered in 
accordance with its own basic policies. (Footnotes omitted)
These attributes of a legislative enactment are to some extent 
discrete: for example, a legislative enactment could be comprehen­
sive but not pre-emptive of the common law or drafted in terms of 
principles. Accordingly, because “Code” is a word that is used to 
describe a legislative enactment that has a number of specific 
characteristics and these attributes are to some extent discrete, to 
ask whether the law of evidence, or any other area of law, ought to be 
embodied in a Code, is not likely to be fruitful. The concept is too 
general to be meaningfully debated. The prospect of an intelligent 
joinder of issues would be enhanced by debating specific questions, 
such as the following:
1. In the subject area should the legislative enactment 
embrace most of the law, should it be comprehensive?
2. How should the statute be interpreted, in particular:
(1) Should the words used in the statute be given meaning 
by reference to the purpose of the legislation rather 
than the plain meaning of the words used?
(2) Should the prior common law be of no precedential 
value in interpreting the statute?
3. Should the legislative enactment pre-empt the common 
law, and unprovided for cases be resolved by reference to the princi­
ples and policies underlying the statute?
4. Should the statute be systematically arranged?
5. Should the statute be drafted in terms of general principles 
rather than in terms of specific detailed rules?
If such questions were debated separately on their merits with 
respect to a particular legislative enactment, it is less likely that the 
common law lawyers would be distracted by vague instincts that the 
concept of codification is inherently evil. Of course, if sufficient of 
the above questions are answered in the affirmative, “ code” 
continues to be a useful word to describe the resultant legislative 
enactment.
General Concerns About Codification
Before turning to the characteristics of the Evidence Code, and
7 Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Methodology, [1962] U. 111. L.F. 291, 292.
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the question of whether these characteristics are consistent with 
common law methodology, 1 would like to set aside a number of 
arguments or concerns about codification that I will not be consider­
ing. Although they are matters which have crept into discussions 
about the Evidence Code, I will not deal with them here in any detail 
as I think they are in large measure too relevant to any serious 
assessment of the merits of the Evidence Code. * Setting them out 
here may help to further define my argument:
1. A Code, no matter how well drafted, cannot be self-execut­
ing. Its success depends ultimately upon the attitude of the courts. 
In the past, common law judges have on occasion completely 
mangled sensible statutory schemes by resorting to jibberish about 
the plain meaning of words, maxims of statutory construction such 
as “Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly 
construed,” and by demonstrating generally a callous insensitivity to 
the need to collaborate with the legislature in implementing contem­
porary social policy. Given these attitudes of the courts it has been 
suggested that a Code, particularly one that requires the Courts to 
apply principles and one that is pre-emptive of the common law, is 
not feasible.
There is, alas, a complaint that cannot be taken lightly. The 
undying allegiance to the policy judgments that underlie the seam­
less web of the common law that many judges appear to have and 
their apparent inability to construe legislation to further legislative 
purposes, must be a matter of concern to anyone who is concerned 
with democratic law-making. On the other hand, to draft legislation 
on the assumption that the Courts are not willing or able to fairly 
discharge the tasks delegated to them is to yield to judicial black­
mail.
The attitude of the Courts must be distinguished from their 
institutional competence. Important institutional constraints do 
impinge upon both the legislature and the courts in law-making. 
These considerations were not, I hasten to add, ignored in the draft­
ing of the Evidence Code.
8 For a general discussion of arguments for and against codification and citations 
to the literature see generally Patterson, The Codification o f  Commercial Law in 
the Light o f  Jurisprudence, in New York Law Revision Commission, Report o f  
the Law Revision Commission for 1955; Schlesinger, The Uniform Commercial 
Code in the Light o f  Comparative Law, in New York Law Revision Commission, 
Report o f  the Law Revision Commission for 1955; Speidel, Summers and White, 
Teaching Materials on Commercial Transactions 1-12 ( 1969); Stone, A Primer 
on Codification 29 Tulane Law Review 303 (1955); R. Pound, 3 Jurisprudence ch. 
19(1959).
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2. One of the arguments frequently raised in the United States 
during the protracted debate about codification in that country in 
the nineteenth century was that the common law was not susceptible 
to formulation in statutory form. Carter, the leading opponent of 
codification, argued:
The fallacy (and it is a gross one), wrapped up in these plausible assertions 
that whatever is known can be written, and that if a rule of law can be writ­
ten by a judge in an opinion, it can be written and enacted in a Code, 
consists in the false assumption that courts lay down rules absolutely, 
whereas they lay them down provisionally only. 9
This argument is still made occasionally by common law lawyers. I 
must confess, however, that I have never been able to give it any 
meaningful content. Perhaps the argument is simply a variation of 
the argument that the common law is flexible and can grown to take 
account of new conditions, whereas a Code is always rigid and, 
therefore, soon outdated. If that is what is meant by the assertion 
“ The common law of evidence cannot be expressed in statutory 
form” , it is an argument that I will deal with later. On the other 
hand, perhaps what is meant by the remark is that the law of 
evidence cannot be expressed in statutory form because it is what­
ever the judge says it is in a particular case. If so, I would agree with 
the assertion but simply ask whether that is a very satisfactory state 
of affairs.
3. A great deal of the literature on codification is devoted to 
speculations about the motivations of the codifiers. It has been 
suggested that there is a close historical relationship between codifi­
cation and the evolution of more egalitarian societies. On the other 
hand, it has been argued that history reveals that Codes are the tools 
of despotic governments.10 Some authors view Codes, historically, 
as instruments of nationalization.11 The Evidence Code was 
motivated by more of these factors and, in spite of the occasional 
(one assumes whimsical) allegation to the contrary, it is not an 
integral part of a larger conspiracy to assimilate English speaking
9 J. Carter, The Proposed Codification o f  O ur Common Law  25-26 (1884).
10 . . .  codification can be viewed as part of the whole historical movement 
which gradually transformed societies whose structures had been based on 
social heirarchy and inequality into societies based on democracy and 
equality.
Maillet, The Historical Significance o f  French Codification, 44 Tulane L. Rev.
681, 687 (1970).
11 Schlesinger, The Uniform Commercial Code in the Light o f  Comparative Law, 1
Inter-Am. L. Rev. 11, 17-22(1959).
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Canada into Quebec. Like the codification movement in Quebec 12 
the motivations for the Evidence Code were entirely practical. A 
judgment was made that the goals of the procedural system could be 
more nearly achieved by an Evidence Code.
4. The spirit of democracy is invoked both by those who sup­
port and those who oppose Codes. Civilians are fond of arguing that 
a Code is more democratic than the common law in its preparation 
and its implementation. Indeed, it has been argued that the legal 
profession in common law countries has always opposed codification 
because a Code is more democratic. In a review of two recent 
biographies of Joseph Story, Morton J. Horwitz suggested that one of 
the reasons that Roscoe Pound rejoiced in the defeat of the codifica­
tion movement in the nineteenth century was that:
Codification was democratic law-making. The rule of the common law 
maintained the separation between law and politics. The former conferred 
the primary law-making powers on an untutored populace; the latter 
enabled the legal profession to control the scope and form of legal 
change.11
5. An argument often put forward in support of codification, 
which also has a clear ideological basis, is that a Code will make the 
law more accessible and more readily intelligible to the average 
citizen. This is perceived as being an important value because of the 
direct relationship between legal demystification and democracy.
On the issue of simplification, the proponents of codification 
have unfortunately often overstated their case. For example, Justian 
declared:
We ordain that our formulation of the law, which with God's help we have 
composed shall have the name of Digest or Pandects: No jurists of posterity 
shall dare to add their commentaries to it or try their verbosity to confuse 
the comprehensive clarity of the Code.14
Napoleon said that his aim to have a Code so simple and convenient 
in its arrangement that the French peasant, reading it in its single, 
slim, pocket-book form by candlelight would be able to know his 
legal rights.
The critics of the Evidence Code — assuming perhaps that the 
drafters were inspired by Justin and Napoleon — were fond of
12 See Brierly, Quebec's Civil Law Codification, 14 McGill L.J. 521 (1968); Crepeau, 
Civil Code Revision in Quebec, 34 Louisiana L. Rev. 921, (1974); Stone, To 
Codify or Not to Codify: Derivation o f  Louisiana Law, 9 A.B. A. International 
and Corp. Bulletin 16 (1964-65).
13 Horwitz, The Conservative Tradition in the Writing o f  American Legal History,
17 Am. Journal of Legal History 275 (1973); see also Tushmet, Perspectives on 
the Development o f  American Law: A Critical Review o f  Friedman's "A History 
o f  American Law, 81 Wisconsin L. Rev. 81, 106-109 (1977).
14 Quoted in Scarman. Codification and Judge-Made Law: A Problem o f  coexis­
tence, 42 Indiana L.J. 355, 357 (1966-67).
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pointing out that such complete simplicity could not be obtained, 
and therefore a “Code” was futile. Others even perceived (and 
rejected) the ideological basis of the argument. One critic remarked 
that the goal of simplicity “ smacks of a longing for “people’s courts” 
where “justice” will be done with despatch and simplicity, without 
formality and fancy verbiage. This has been achieved in a number of 
countries behind the Iron Curtain.” 1' The proponents of the argu­
ment that because complete simplicity cannot be achieved and, 
therefore, a Code should not be attempted, commit, of course, the 
logical fallacy of bifurcation. The impossibility of drafting a Code of 
Evidence that would permit a layperson upon reading it to become 
an evidence scholar does not foreclose the possibility of drafting a 
Code that is at least more accessible and easier to understand than 
the present law of evidence. Some would say that much of value 
would be achieved if the law of evidence could be made more 
comprehensible even to lawyers.
6. As a final preliminary matter, I am concerned here with the 
meaning of the word Code when used to refer to a single piece of 
legislation. I am not using it in the sense of an all-embracing codifi­
cation of the law such as the classic codes of the civil law world. Nor 
do I wish to enter the larger debate of whether all the common law is 
doomed to codification.,h
Characteristics o f  a Code
In discussing the compatibility of the Evidence Code and the 
common law, I will discuss only three characteristics of the Code: it 
is comprehensive, pre-emptive of the common law and drafted in 
terms of principles. It is these characteristics that are most frequent­
ly alleged to make it “ foreign” to the common law and different in 
kind from statutes traditionally enacted in common law jurisdic­
tions. Indeed, much of the debate has centered on the fact that the 
Code is drafted in terms of principles rather than specific detailed 
rules.
1 • Com preh ensive
A statute is drafted against the background of a body of law, 
much of which is to be preserved. Details of the law are to be 
changed and only those details to be changed are enacted in statu­
tory form. A Code, on the other hand, is designed to set out the
15 W ritten Comments Received From the Public Relating to The Laws of Evidence
26 (1976).
16 Many of the criticisms of codification relate only to some form of all-embracing 
codification. See Hahlo, Codifying The Common Law: Protracted Gestation, 38 
Mod. L. Rev. 23 (1975).
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whole law relating to a particular subject in a comprehensive man­
ner. It is to form the basic source of legal rules in that field. This 
does not necessarily mean that the Code contains all the detailed 
rules governing the subject which it treats. Certainly the Code of 
Evidence contemplates that some specific rules of evidence will arise 
that are not specifically covered by the Code. Examples of rules that 
might be found outside the Code are rules regarding burden of proof 
or authentication that relate to a specific offence or document. As a 
simple matter of convenience these rules of evidence are most 
appropriately found in the statutes dealing with the particular 
subject matter to which they relate.
The Code is comprehensive, however, in the sense that all of the 
basic rules of evidence are set out in the Code. Only detailed rules 
that might form exceptions or illustrations of these general rules and 
which relate to particular matters, will be found outside the Code in 
other statutory instruments. The comprehensiveness of the Code is 
apparent from its general sections. The Code states that except as 
provided in the Code or any other Act: all relevant evidence is 
admissible;17 every person is competent and compellable to 
testify;18 no testimony is privileged;14 all hearsay evidence is admis­
sible. 20
For a legislative enactment to be comprehensive, it must 
identify an autonomous branch of the law. Some matters fall clearly 
under the heading “evidence” because they deal with the admissibil­
ity of evidence and reflect procedural values. However, the classifica­
tion of other matters such as burden of proof, various discovery 
devices and judicial notice are more troublesome. At the end of the 
day the decision of whether or not to include these peripheral 
matters in the Code was made largely on the basis of convenience of 
reference and historical precedent.
A comprehensive statement of the law has two important 
advantages in the area of evidence: firstly, it renders the law more 
accessible; secondly, it permits evidentiary problems to be placed in 
the context of the whole of the law of evidence and thus to be 
resolved in a manner that is consistent with the underlying principles 
of this body of law.
A priori there would seem to be little room for differences of 
opinion with respect to the desirability of expressing the law relating
17 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence s. 4(1) (1975).
18 Ibid s. 54
19 Ibid s.32
20 Ibid s.27
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to a particular subject m atter in written form and collecting it, as 
much as possible, within the four corners of one document. It would 
seem obvious that the law would then be easier to learn and easier to 
find. It cannot be maintained seriously that one can find the answer 
to a given problem of evidence more quickly by searching through 
the digests and encyclopedias, ferreting out the cases, reading them, 
analyzing them, and then abstracting their ratio than by simply 
looking at a Code, finding the relevant section and interpreting it. 
This is particularly so with respect to the rules of evidence since most 
evidence rulings are made in the lower courts and even though they 
may deal with important points of evidence they may never get 
appealed because the case may be settled or for some other reason 
not appealed. Thus on any particular issue there are likely to be a 
series of cases, many duplicative, many irrelevant, many decided 
without reference to other similar cases. Anyone who has had the 
unfortunate experience of researching an evidence problem in any 
depth knows what a frustrating and perplexing task it is.
Accessibility is an important value particularly with respect to 
the rules of evidence because evidence problems frequently arise for 
the first time during the course of a trial when the judge or lawyers 
have little time to research the law before it is applied. Furthermore, 
if the rules are accessible, experienced and inexperienced counsel in 
that situation will be placed on a more equal basis. At present 
experienced counsel are able to manipulate obscure cases in a very 
intimidating fashion. In the face of such authority, the judge and 
less experienced counsel are often reluctant to have the trial 
adjourned so that they can retire to the library and seek out the rele­
vant case law. A comprehensive statement of the law, such as a 
Code, would enable problems to be tied down to a particular section. 
The section could be referred to in court, and if necessary, its 
meaning debated.
The existence of a readily available and authoritative statement 
of the rules of evidence would also be extremely helpful in conduct­
ing the trial of cases in provincial courts, where often a library or 
even an encyclopedia on evidence law is not available. A Code will 
reduce the possibility of erroneous rulings, and thus, the number of 
appeals, and will generally expedite the trial of such cases.
The rules of evidence must also be known to practitioners who 
do not appear in court. A draftsman, for example, must often take 
into account problems that might at some time result in litigation. 
He must draft, therefore, with problems of proof in mind. With a 
code, each lawyer will have a pamphlet of the rules.
The rules will remain accessible because the various provisions 
of the Code can be easily annotated as they are interpreted by the 
courts. Amendments can be made when needed and new sections 
added. All sources of evidence law can thus remain readily available.
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The second advantage of a comprehensive statement of the law 
is that it permits evidentiary problems to be placed within the con­
text of the rules of evidence as a whole. For instance, if a document is 
to be admitted into evidence, three evidentiary problems commonly 
arise: First, if a document is being admitted as truth of the matters 
asserted in it, the document must come within one of the exceptions 
to the hearsay rule. In a code, all of these exceptions and the condi­
tions upon which they rest are set out. The relevant exception, if any, 
can be quickly noted and the conditions of that exception reviewed. 
Second, the document must be authenticated. The common law 
developed numerous rules, or numerous methods, by which a docu­
ment must be authenticated. That is to say, the common law 
developed numerous rigid requirements of proof that have to be 
followed to prove that a document is what it purports to be. Again, 
in a code there would be a single rule dealing with authentication. If 
particular methods of authentication were required in specific 
instances, they would all be conveniently set out so that a quick 
reference would inform counsel of the best way to authenticate a 
particular document. Finally, before a document is admitted, the 
proponent of the document must prove that it is an original or, if it is 
not an original, that it comes within one of the exceptions to the best 
evidence rule. This rule and the exceptions to it would be set out in 
the Code. Counsel could quickly review the section to see what the 
definition of best evidence is and what exception, if any, a non-origi­
nal document might come within.
Under the present law, when an objection is made to the admis­
sion of a document the exact basis for the objection is not always 
clear, and the above grounds for excluding the document often con­
fused. Moreover, even after an exhaustive review of the problem and 
a search through the sources, one is often left with a disquieting 
feeling that there is an obscure rule of evidence or case that might be 
dredged up to hold the evidence inadmissible.
Even apart from these practical advantages, a comprehensive 
statement of evidence law was necessary once the decision was made 
that the bias in the rules of evidence should be changed from a bias 
in favour of exclusion to a bias in favour of admissibility. The under­
lying philosophy of the Evidence Code is that all relevant evidence is 
admissible. The only way this change in emphasis could be achieved 
was by stating this principle and then proceeding to articulate all, 
and the only, exceptions to it. Finally, a comprehensive statement 
was necessary in order to facilitate the adoption of an overall and 
literally consistent conceptual framework so that the Code could be 
pre-emptive of the common law.
2. Pre-emptive
Invariably gaps in a Code’s comprehensiveness will be found.
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All factual patterns that might emerge cannot be anticipated. Thus 
the Code must provide a methodology for resolving what have been 
variously described as “ unprovided for,” “doubtful,” “hard” or 
“ unenvisaged” cases.21 One solution would be to have the judge 
return to common law principles to resolve unprovided for cases. 
This methodology is commonly adopted in common law jurisdic­
tions. All the commercial codes in the United States, for example, 
have a common law saving clause. Generally a clause is adopted 
such as:
In any case not provided for in this Code the rules of law and equity includ­
ing the law merchant shall govern. --
The Code or statute is regarded as being essentially supplementary 
to the common law jurisprudence. When a controversy is not covered 
directly by the statute, even though it might be within the general 
subject area of the statute, no further reference is made to the 
statute.
The alternative methodology for resolving unprovided-for cases 
is to direct the judge to look to the underlying concepts and theories 
of the Code and apply them in resolving the question. When the 
judge confronts a gap or an unforeseen situation, his or her duty is to 
find, by extrapolation and analogy, a solution consistent with the 
policy of the codified law. The Code becomes the only source of law 
in the subject area. It pre-empts all the previous law. This is, of 
course, the methodology of statutory construction used in most civil 
law jurisdictions and the methodology commonly ascribed to a 
Code.21
21 Dickinson, The Problem o f  the Unprovided Case, 2 Recueil D 'Etudes Sur Les 
Sources Du Droit En L 'Honneur De Francois Geny 503 (1935).
22 N.I.L. para. 1%, quoted in Gilmore, On Statutory A bsolescence. 39 U. of Col. L. 
Rev. 461, 466-467 (1967). Under the Uniform Commercial Code it is unclear 
whether the courts should reason by analogy to the Code itself in resolving un­
provided for cases or whether they should resort to the princples of the common 
law. See Young, Review o f  G. Gilmore, Security Interests in Personal Property, 
66 Colum. L. Rev. 1571, 1574-77 (1966); Hawkland, Uniform Commercial 
"Code" Methodology, [1962) U. 111. L.F. 291 (1962); Franklin, On the Legal 
M ethod o f  the Uniform Commercial Code, 16 Law & Contemp. Prob. 330 (1951).
23 (The civilian). . . looks at the articles of a Code not as mere rulings, but as 
particular expressions of more general rules. Therefore, if no express 
answer to a certain problem is found in the Code, it is not improper to con- 
consider various articles in order to induce from them a more general rule 
and to apply this if it can give a solution. It has sometimes been said that 
articles of a code are not only law, but sources of law. This is true, not only 
in the sense that the courts may. by deduction, decide on the implications of 
a certain article, but also in the sense that the courts may, if necessary, use 
induction to discover the general rules implied in the provisions of a code 
and then, reverting to deduction, develop the full potential of these rules in 
the solution of the problem at hand.
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Under the Evidence Code this latter methodology is explicitly 
adopted. The judge must resolve unprovided for cases by reference 
to the principles embodied in the Code. Section 3 provides:
Matters of evidence not provided for in this Code shall be determined in 
the light of reason and experience so as to secure the purpose of this
C ode.24
Thus, the judge must ask, in resolving unprovided*for cases: given 
the reasons, the purposes, and the policies underlying the provisions 
of the Code, how would the legislature have resolved this particular 
problem? He or she looks to analogous problems and analogous 
considerations that are covered or dealt with in the Code. The judge 
does not ask: how would a common law judge have resolved this 
problem if this statute did not exist?
If the law of evidence is a unified body of knowledge and is 
comprised of rules that are designed to reconcile certain procedural
23 (Continued)
Tunc. The Grand Outlines o f  the Code, in B. Schwartz (ed.), The Code Napoleon 
and the Common-Law World 19, 31 (1956).
It may be that the problem pressing for adjudication is not controlled by the 
code a rtic le .. . .  Nevertheless, the orthodoxies of civilian technique call for 
the use of a code text by way of analogy to meet the problem of the unpro­
provided case. This is a striking difference from the British tradition, where 
we encounter theories that statutes should not be given effect in situations 
that they actually control. The civilian, however, is accustomed to regard a 
code text as having the same sort of projective value as the common law 
regards the decisions of the judges as having. Thus, the statutory text enjoys 
a vitality even greater than it was intended to have. The technique of the 
civilian in solving the unprovided case, thus becomes a struggle over the pro­
jective value of code articles.
Franklin. The Historic Function o f  the American Law Institute: Restatement as 
Transitional to Codification? 47 Harv. L. Rev. 1367, 1378-79 (1934).
See also Monow, Louisiana Blueprint: Civilian Codification and Legal M ethod 
fo r  State and Nation, 17Tul. L. Rev. 351 (1943); Tate. Civilian Methodology in 
Louisiana, 44 Tul. L. Rev. 673, (1970); Von Mehren, The Judicial Process: A  
Comparative Analysis, 5 Am. J. Comp. L. 197, 204 (1956); Gilmore, Legal Real­
ism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 Yale L.J. 1037, 1043 (1961). In England when the 
English and Scottish Law Commissioners began working on the codification of 
contract law, the issue of how unprovided for cases would be resolved lead to seri­
ous differences of opinion. See Chloros, Principle, Reason and Policy in the 
Development o f  European Law, 17 Int. and Comp. L.Q. 849, 863-4 (1960).
24 Law Reform Commission of Canada, Report on Evidence, s.3 (1975). Unfor­
tunately this section has a ring to it which is very close to that of a section in the 
Russian Civil Code. Section 4 of the Soviet Civil Code provides:
In the absence of legislative enactments or decrees bearing upon the decision 
of a case, the court shall decide the case guided by the general policies of the 
workers and peasants government.
Cited in E.W. Patterson, Jurisprudence 286 [1953].
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principles, and is not simply a ragbag of multifarious rules decided 
on an ad hoc basis, it seems self-evident that its interpretation and 
application should be consistent with these underlying principles. 
This can only be achieved if judges turn to the Code, rather than to 
the common law, to extract premises for judicial reasoning in areas 
where there is a gap in the Code. To draw upon the common law 
would involve the risk that credence would be given to a principle 
which the Code had explicitly or implicitly rejected in other areas. 
Although the adoption of this methodology was clearly inspired by 
the civil law tradition, it is not a methodology that should be foreign 
to the mental processes of good common law lawyers, or in any way 
inimical to the common law tradition.
The reasoning process involved in using the policies and princi­
ples embodied in the Code as a premise for judicial reasoning is not 
much different from the reasoning process involved when a common 
law judicial craftsperson uses precedent. The judge distills from a 
precedent a principle and then uses it as a premise in reasoning 
about the problem before him. Precedents are used in effect as 
indications as to how the law has reconciled competing interests in 
resolving the particular problem. The same kind of deductive 
reasoning is involved in construing a Code. The only difference is 
that the judge does not turn to cases to derive the legal principles 
which will form the premises for judicial reasoning, he or she turns to 
the Code. The judge tries to implement the legislative design of the 
Code by extending the policies and the reasons underlying it. He or 
she looks to analogous sections rather than analogous cases.
Furthermore, common law courts frequently, or at least occa­
sionally, do use principles embodied in a statute as a premise for 
judicial reasoning and numerous commentators have argued that 
this is a form of reasoning that they should engage in with more
25 If it is correct that the grand style of appellate judging involves looking at 
the situation before the court in terms of its type situation and arriving at a 
conclusion as to what is the best policy, then if you look at the precise lang­
uage of the statute and at the situation before you and the reason for the 
language seems to be present in the situation, you can expand by analogy or. 
if the reason is absent, limit the statutory language. This is a perfectly per­
missible reasoning by analogy with the statutes instead of with cases; the 
same principle exactly. You can say to yourself, "This is the reason for the 
rule which is enunciated here; the explicit language does not ccver the situ­
ation which has arisen; should I apply the policy? Are the situations suffici­
ently similar so that the reasons that make this a good policy in the situation 
covered precisely by the language should carry over to the situation which is 
not precisely covered by the language?”
S. Mentschikoff, Commercial Transactions 11 ( 1969).
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frequency.2h Justice Traynor has collected an impressive number of 
cases where the courts have argued by analogy from statutes. 
Indeed, he found that in certain periods of history common law 
judges agressively pursued the use of statutes as judicial premises in 
the development of the common law. He observed:27
. . .  the chatty year books were replete with creative lawmaking in the 
courts on the basis of statutes. Judges used the eyes at the back of their 
heads to note statutory rules as a source for analogous decisions.
Other commentators have discerned a recent trend in relying on 
statutes as a basis for analogical reasoning.28
Drafted in Terms o f  Principles
A characteristic commonly ascribed to a Code is that it is 
drafted in general terms, in principles, that must be referred to in 
resolving particular cases. A statute, by comparison, is drafted in 
terms of detailed rules; an effort is made to foresee and specifically 
cover every possible factual circumstance.24 The Evidence Code, by
26 Landis. Statutes and the Sources o f  Law, in R. Pound (ed). Harvard Legal Essays 
213 (1934); Schaefer, Precedent and Policy 19 (1956); Stone, The Common Law 
in the United States. 50 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (1936); Pound, Common Law and Legis­
lation, 21 Harv. L. Rev. 383 (1900); Page, Statutes as Common Law Principles, 
[1944] Wise. L. Rev. 175; Thorne, The Equity o f  a Statute and Hevdon's Case,
31 HI. L. Rev. 202-(1936).
27 Traynor, Statutes Revolving In Common Law Orbits, 17 Catholic U.L. Rev—401, 
405 (1968).
28 Note. The Legitimacy o f  Civil Law Reasoning in the Common Law: Justice Har­
lan’s Contribution, 82 Yale L.J. 258 (1972); 3 C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory 
Construction: A Revision o f  Sutherland Statutory' Construction para. 53.01 -53.02: 
R. Schlesinger, Comparative Law: Cases - Text - Materials 398 (30 ed. 1970).
29 W. Dale, Legislative Drafting: A New Approach (1977); In the Preface to their 
"Draft Evidence Code" the Scottish Law Commission gave the following explan­
ation for drafting in terms of principles. It is worth quoting at length:
It is clear that the form of a code must differ radically from that of an exist­
ing British statute. The present form of such statutes is conditioned by the 
fact that they are drafted against the background of the body of existing law, 
details of which it is desired to change. A code, on the other hand, is design­
ed to set out the whole law relating to a particular subject in a comprehen­
sive and systematic way, and to form the basic source of legal principle in 
that field. It is neither designed simply to effect alterations to existing law, 
though it may do so incidentally, nor simply to restate the law. though in 
fact it may do this; it is designed rather to supplant the existing law com­
pletely in a particular field. In this situation the particularised drafting 
which is thought appropriate to existing legislation would be out of place. It 
is not desirable to put the Courts in a straitjacket from which they will 
inevitably seek to escape; the history of foreign codifications suggests that 
attemps to envisage all possible situations are conspicuous only by their fail­
ure.
A code, therefore, should be drafted with the primary aim of enunciating
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and large, is drafted in general term s.30 Is this style of drafting in­
compatible with the common law tradition? The vociferous 
criticisms made against the Code on the grounds that it was drafted 
in the civilian style, or that it gives too much discretion to the judge 
because it is drafted in terms of general principles, is an indication 
that at least some people feel it is incompatible. A review of the costs 
and benefits of drafting in terms of general principles or in terms of 
detailed rules, however, reveals that the question of what style of 
drafting to choose is pragmatic and that the same issues and consid­
erations confront a draftsperson in both common and civil law 
systems.
Before discussing the considerations that led the draftpersons 
of the Evidence Code to draft, in the main, in terms of general 
principles, let me define my terms. The distinction between detailed 
and specifically drafted rules and rules drafted in terms of general 
principles is similar to the distinction made by some authors 
between rules and principles, rules and discretion, and formal and 
nonformal decision-making. ” Since, however, I do not wish to enter 
the more general debate raised by these authors, I will stipulate 
definitions. ’’
To apply a rule, or a detailed legislative provision, the judge 
needs to look only at a limited range of information. The facts he 
must find in order to decide if the rule applies are specific, usually 
obvious, discrete, and easily determined. An example of a rule would
29 (Continued)
clearly and simply the basic principles of the relevant branch of the law in a 
form in which they can be readily understood by legal practitioners and 
others who may wish to consult it. The application of these principles to 
particular problems, which is often a m atter of concern in existing statutes, 
should be left as a rule to the Courts to determine. It is for the Courts to give 
effect to those principles against the background of a pattern of life which 
constantly alters. It is recognised that with the passage of time the interpre­
tation of particular articles may change; this is a result to be sought rather 
than to be deplored.
Scottish Law Commission, Draft Evidence Code 3-4 (1973).
30 ‘‘A codifying Act on the law of evidence, drafted in the continental fashion, has 
been produced by the Canadian Law Reform Commission." Dale, Legislative 
Drafting: A New Approach 339 (1977).
31 See R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977); Greenawalt, Discretion and 
Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters that Bind Judges, 75 Colum. 
L. Rev. 359(1975). Sartorius, Social Policy and Judicial Legislation, 8 Am. Phil. 
Q. 151 (1971). Raz, Legal Principles and the Limits ofLaw, 81 Yale L.J. 823(1972).
32 For a similar analysis see Ehrlich and Posner, A n Economic Analysis o f  Legal 
Rulemaking, 3 Journal of Legal Studies 257 (1974); Kennedy, Form and Sub­
stance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 (1976).
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be a section which reads: “ All prior consistent, out-of-court state­
ments made by a witness are inadmissible.” Normally, the judge will 
be able to determine whether the rule applies with a high degree of 
certainty and without considering the policies that led to its enact­
ment. However, even with such an apparently straightforward rule 
an understanding of its purpose will be necessary, in some cases, to 
determine its application; for example, in deciding whether 
“ conduct” in this context can amount to a statement.
By contrast, the application of a principle requires the judge to 
consider the entirety of a factual situation and to assess whether it 
should apply by reference to its purpose. In applying a principle, the 
judge will have to engage in weighing the competing interests as well 
as making a factual judgment. For example, instead of having a rule 
such as the one stated above, excluding prior out-of-court state­
ments, the Evidence Code contains a section requiring the judge to 
exclude evidence if its probative value is outweighed by the danger 
that its proof and disproof would consume an undue amount of 
time. This is, of course, the purpose of the rule which excludes prior 
statements. It is designed to expedite trials.
Throughout the rules of evidence, or any area of law for that 
matter, the decision of whether to draft in terms of rules or princi­
ples has to be made. What I would like to do then is review some of 
the considerations that must be taken into account in deciding 
whether to draft rules with specificity or to draft rules of higher 
generality. To return to the point of my argument, these factors 
would be important whether one were drafting in a civil or a 
common law jurisdiction. And there is no reason why a considera­
tion of these factors should inevitably lead to the conclusion that 
drafting should always be done in terms of detailed rules in a 
common law jurisdiction.
Benefits o f  Dra fting in Terms o f  Rules
One of the most frequently claimed virtues of rules is that their 
application is certain. This general proposition subsumes a whole 
series of arguments offered in favour of detailed rules: they facilitate 
private planning, thereby reducing litigation; they act as a curb on 
the arbitrary powers of the judge; they ensure equality before the 
law; and, they result in more democratic law-making because it is 
the elected representatives who assume the responsibility for making 
the necessary value choices. All these arguments depend for their 
validity upon the proposition that the application of rules is 
predictable.
There would appear, on its face, to be little more room for dis­
puting the proposition that a rule is more likely than a principle to 
lead to predictable results. By definition the number of factors that a 
decision-maker must take into account in applying a rule are fewer
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than those to be considered in applying a standard. Furthermore, 
the application of a rule does not involve the weighing of competing 
interests. It is important, however, to go beyond such a facile asser­
tion. A number of observations about the predictability of the appli­
cation of rules as compared to the predictability of the application of 
principles may be made.
In many instances, what appear to be rules are simply princi­
ples masquerading as rules. Thus, the claimed advantages of predic­
tability are illusory. A number of concepts in evidence law illustrate 
this phenomenon; for example, the concept of competency. Lawyers 
often advert to the rule that young children are incompetent to give 
testimony. The Evidence Code does not contain a rule dealing 
explicitly with the competency of witnesses. Rather, a section 
provides that the judge can exclude evidence if its probative value is 
outweighed by the danger either that it will mislead the jury or con­
sume an undue amount of time. Critics have alleged that this is but 
another instance in which a perfectly workable and certain rule has 
been replaced by a discretionary principle. Such an allegation 
assumes that the rules of competency are self-executing, or that they 
give the judge greater guidance in specific instances than the princi­
ple that “where, because of a witness’ perceptual capabilities or 
moral development, his or her testimony is of slight probative value 
and might mislead the jury or consume an inordinate amount of 
time, it should be excluded.” The Evidence Code does not change 
the present law. It simply makes explicit the judgment that must be 
made in holding a witness incompetent to give testimony.
Another example of a concept which involves the application of 
a principle and not a rule is the concept of legal relevancy. In the 
Code, relevancy is defined as logical relevancy and then a provision 
is added which permits the judge to exclude relevant evidence if its 
probative value is outweighed by, for instance, the undue consump­
tion of time. This is another example, so it is often alleged, of where 
the drafters have replaced a rule (that evidence must be legally rele­
vant to be admissible) with a principle or discretion (that requires 
the judge to weigh the probative value of offered evidence against the 
dangers of prejudice, the needless consumption of time and so on). 
But, what is "legal relevance”? By what process of reasoning does a 
judge reach the conclusion that evidence is legally relevant? He 
cannot apply a standard of logical relevance alone. Even in a simple 
trial a logician could point to logically relevant evidence that would 
consume months to hear. Therefore, where the judge rules evidence 
legally irrelevant, he is invariably engaged in a balancing process. He 
is balancing the probative value of the evidence against the amount 
of time that it would consume to hear evidence against the amount 
of time that it would consume to hear evidence tending to prove and 
disprove the fact. Again, the Code does not increase the amount of
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discretion a judge has in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, it 
simply recognizes that this evidentiary concept, the concept of legal 
relevancy, embraces the application of a principle.
Many evidentiary concepts are similar to the tw o  just mentioned. 
Their label tends to obscure the judgmental element involved in 
applying them. All that the Code does is make the principle or dis­
cretion explicit. The drafters attempted to compel judges to address 
themselves expressly to the relevant considerations in applying 
evidentiary concepts so that a weighing of the competing interests 
becomes, not only an explanation for the judge’s decision, but also 
part of the justification for his or her decisions.
Rules often do not lead to certainty because they provide judges 
with the opportunity of engaging in conceptual reasoning. The 
collateral fact rule is an example. In the early nineteenth century, 
judges used the term collateral fact to describe a legal consequence. 
Evidence was excluded because it bore so indirectly on the issues in 
the case that its probative value was outweighed by the danger that 
the admission of evidence tending to prove or disprove it would 
consume an inordinate amount of time. Subsequently judges began 
phrasing this principle as a rule - evidence of collateral facts is 
inadmissible. They began to use the term collateral itself as a 
premise for legal reasoning. This lead to great uncertainty in the 
jurisprudence because if no reference is made to the reason for using 
it, the term “collateral” can assume many shades of meaning. The 
meaning of evidentiary concepts such as res gestae, burden of proof 
and similar fact evidence, are similarly indeterminate because of the 
effort the judges make to attach meaning to them by reference to 
their ordinary usage or the facts of previous cases. ”
Even if rules have a specific reference, their rigidity and the fact 
that they can never perfectly implement the reasons for their exis­
tence also tends to introduce in trials an aforeseen lack of predic­
tability. It has been observed countless times that courts, torn 
between the duties of staying within the law or reaching a just result, 
frequently accommodate the latter by manipulating the former. It 
was to this well-established process that Holmes directed his 
epigrammatic remark, “hard cases make bad law” . Decisions 
arrived at through the technique of manipulation and adverse con­
struction may result in justice for the immediate parties. However, 
they lead to great uncertainty in the application of the law and leave 
in their wake a twisted law to haunt lawyers and confuse judges in 
subsequent cases not involving the same “ fireside equities” . This is 
seen again and again in the laws of evidence. Indeed, the whole of 
the case law dealing with the rules relating to corroboration can be
33 See J. Stone. Legal Systems and Lawyer's Reasonings Ch. 7 (1%9).
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rationally explained only on this basis. Apellate court judges, who 
are of the view that in a particular case there is insufficient evidence 
to convict the accused, frequently resort to some aspect of the law of 
corroboration to achieve their desired result, a new trial. They might 
hold that the trial judge did not properly explain the rules relating to 
corroboration to the jury, the evidence the trial judge found to be 
corroborative could not in law be corroborative, or that the judge 
made some other error relating to the countless distinctions and 
refinements that have been engrafted into this body of law. The 
obscure flexibility that this introduces into the law is, of course, 
much more pernicious than that introduced by principles. Stating the 
rules in terms of principles directs the courts to consider and rule 
directly on the dangers that might arise in specific situations. It 
permits the courts a safety valve to prevent distortions and the 
consequent pernicious uncertainty of rules.
The uncertainty inherent in the application of principles is 
often greatly exaggerated. Principles such as good faith, due care, 
fairness, unconscionability, unjust enrichment, and reasonableness 
abound throughout the law, and uncertainty has not resulted. 
Empirical evidence about the predictibility of the application of 
principles is available by reviewing the experience with the Uniform 
Commercial Code in the United States. Karl Llewlyn, who was pri­
marily responsible for drafting Article 2 of the Code, employed many 
broad standards. This drafting sytle was implicitly based on the 
claim that ideas, like “ reasonableness” and “good faith” , provide 
greater predictability in practice than an intricate and technical rule 
system.M The Article has not given rise to excessive litigation and 
has survived with few amendments.
While some of the principles used in the Code may appear 
vague in the abstract, their application will usually not be in doubt 
in specific factual situations. Furthermore, as jurisprudence 
develops in the “doubtful” cases, the principles will be given even 
more specific content, by what John Dickinson has aptly referred to 
as “ the downward elaboration of principles.” ,h
A final thought on this question of the predictability of rules. 
Even conceding that the application of rules is more predictable 
than principles, evidence is an area of law where certainty is not the 
all important requirement it is often assumed to be. Rules of 
evidence are generally not designed to act as standards of conduct,
34 See W. Twinning, Karl Llewellyn and The Realist Movement 322 (1973).
35 See Gilmore. On Statutory' Obsolescence, 39 U. of Col. L. Rev. 461. 473 (1966-67).
36 Dickinson. Legal Rules: Their Application and Elaboration, 70 U. Penn. L. Rev. 
1052. 1058 (1931).
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as rules that people deliberately intend to invoke in ordering their 
affairs (except to the extent that a person relies on them in fashion­
ing a transaction so that it can be easily proved at trial, and under 
any system it would generally be easy to plan to ensure admissibil­
ity); nor are rules of evidence designed to encourage or discourage 
certain kinds of social or economic activity (except in the area of 
privilege: if the purpose of a privilege is to foster candor, people 
must have confidence that at trial the rule will operate to render 
their confidential statements inadmissible). Certainty is, of course, 
important in those areas of law that are designed to facilitate private 
ordering to deter people from or encourage them to engage in 
certain activities. In the main, the purposes of the rules of evidence 
are: to further certain procedural interests, such as expedition, 
finality, and administrative convenience; and to ensure, to the extent 
possible, and within the parameters of the judicial trial, that 
disputes are resolved on their merits.
Predictability becomes more important when a dispute arises 
and the parties have to predict the outcome of possible litigation. If 
the evidentiary rules offer predictability at this stage, outcome of the 
case will be easier to predict, thus increasing the likelihood of settle­
ment and reducing the total cost of dispute resolution. Further, if a 
case which is doubtful on its merits goes to trial, predictability in the 
application of evidence rules will reduce the costs of trial by reducing 
the number and length of voir dires and the number of appeals on 
evidentiary matters. Yet, the importance of predictability, even at 
these stages of the process, can be exaggerated. Seldom will the pos­
sible admission of one or two items of evidence be a determinative 
factor in deciding whether to go to trial. And the costs of preparing 
an offer of proof that is later ruled inadmissible are not nearly as 
great as the costs involved when a case is not decided on its merits.
Costs o f  Drafting in Terms o f  Rules
Even assuming that rules are more certain in application than 
principles and that there is a need for certainty in evidence law, this 
benefit must be weighed against the costs of enacting rules as 
opposed to principles.
The most obvious and, in many cases, the most severe cost of 
rules is that a rule will never perfectly implement the policies under­
lying its formulation; it will, in some cases, be over inclusive, and, in 
others, under inclusive. This is necessarily so because by definition a 
rule excludes relevant information from the decision-making 
process.
The rules relating to spousal competency can be used to illus­
trate this cost. A policy decision might be made that certain relation­
ships in society deserve protection to the extent that one party to
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such a relationship should not be compelled to testify against the 
other because that will endanger the relationship. How should this 
policy be implemented? Since the family relationship is perhaps the 
most important such relationship, a rule could be enacted that one 
spouse cannot be compelled to testify against the other. An obvious 
problem with this means of implementing the policy is that, in some 
cases, such a rule does not implement the policy, and in other cases, 
it extends far beyond the policy. For instance, what about a common 
law relationship? Clearly, the rationale would cover the relationship 
but the rule would not. What about a married couple who have been 
separated for a number of years or whose relationship has complete­
ly broken down? The rationale would not extend to them but the 
rule would.
The extent of this cost depends upon how nearly the rule imple­
ments the policy and how serious, in terms of social costs, is the 
failure to cover all the situations to which the policy of the rule would 
extend. In most areas of law, guidelines can probably be formulated 
to assist in resolving this question. In Evidence law, for example, the 
under- or over-inclusiveness of a rule to implement the policy that 
evidence of slight probative value should be excluded if its proof and 
disproof will result in an undue delay of the trial (such as a rule 
excluding collateral facts or prior consistent statements,) is less 
serious than the under-inclusiveness of a rule designed to exclude 
evidence that might tend to prejudice the trier of fact against the 
accused in a criminal case. The former policy is concerned with 
economic costs, the latter with protecting innocent persons. This 
consideration undoubtedly accounts for the fact that judges are 
more willing to recognize that they have a residual discretion to 
exclude prejudicial evidence than they are willing to recognize that 
they have a discretion to exclude merely time-consuming or 
confusing evidence.
This cost of rules, the fact that they are both over- and under- 
inclusive, is particularly serious with many of the present rules of 
evidence and it is related to another attack made on conceptualism 
by the American Realists. The Realists noted that concepts almost 
invariably emerge which abstract reality at too high or too general a 
level in order to ensure that the rule being developed is not under- 
inclusive. Thus they attacked concepts such as “ master and 
servant” , “property” , and “consideration” because they lumped 
together socially disparate situations that needed differential treat­
ment. Such criticism can easily be made of many rules of evidence. 
The hearsay rule, for example, classifies together all assertions made 
outside of a particular courtroom in a particular case and treats 
them alike. It is a concept that abstracts reality at such a general 
level that the differences it ignores are vastly more important than 
the single similarity upon which it is based. As Professor Lowinger
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has noted, “ It is almost self-evident that there can be little utility in a 
class which is so broad as to include the prattling of a child and the 
mouthings of a drunk, the encyclical of a pope, a learned treatise, an 
encyclopedia article, a newspaper report, an unverified rumor from 
anonymous sources, an affidavit by a responsible citizen, a street 
corner remark, the judgment of a court, and innumerable other 
equally disparate sources of information.” r
To reduce the coverage of rules - to finely-tune their application 
• exceptions might be created to carve out situations in which the 
rule is obviously over-inclusive. The courts, for example, have 
created a series of exceptions to the hearsay rule. Indeed no two 
authors can agree on the number. However, as well as introducing 
into the law an immense degree of complexity, this method of 
attempting to make rules “just” often leads to arbitrariness. For 
example, the present rule that spouses cannot be compelled to testify 
against one another is subject to over thirty exceptions. The applica­
tion of these exceptions can lead to the following anomalous 
results: if a man is charged with the rape of a woman, his wife can be 
compelled to testify against him; if he is charged with the murder of 
the same woman, she cannot; if a man is charged with attempting to 
commit buggery his wife can be forced to testify against him; if he 
commits it, she cannot; if a man murders his wife’s mother, sister or 
child, his wife cannot testify against him even if she wishes. The rule 
is often justified on the grounds that society has an interest in 
preserving the marriage relationship because of the harm caused the 
children by a marriage breakdown, and yet children can be compel­
led to testify against parents and vice versa. Thus, this cost of rules, 
that they often must abstract reality at a high level of generality so as 
not to be under-inclusive and are therefore often over-inclusive, can­
not be cured in most cases without introducing enormous complexity 
and a degree of arbitrariness into the law.
A second cost of rules is that they tend to freeze the law. The 
values or conditions of one period of time become encased in a rule 
that is not changed to account for changing values or conditions. 
The application of principles more readily admits a solution to this 
problem. For example, the common law rules relating to best evi­
dence could not be applied to computer printouts, but the principle 
clearly covered them. The statutory rules creating a marital privilege 
could not be extended to cover an increasing number of common law 
relationships or extended families. By contrast, a common law 
principle relating to the waiver of formal proof for notorious facts 
embraces new scientific developments as they emerge.
37 Loevinger, Facts, Evidence and Legal Proof, 9 Western Reserve L. Rev. 154, 165- 
166 (1950).
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Another cost of rules, in this area at least, is that they render the 
law incomprehensible to lay people. Rules, as mentioned, are 
arbitrary and their purpose is often obscure. Principles on th e other 
hand explicitly reflect their purpose and will often be con.prehen- 
sible to the non-lawyer as a result. Furthermore the principles 
underlying the hundreds of detailed rules of evidence are few in 
number. Compare the thirty pages of the Evidence Jode to Wig- 
more’s ten volumes on common law evidence. The analysis involved 
in deciding whether to draft a rule or a principle can only be made 
after a careful weighing of the costs and benefits of using one 
approach as opposed to the other. In drafting the Evidence Code the 
drafters were often of the view that the benefits of drafting a princi­
ple in a particular section, outweighed the costs. While this method 
of drafting might have been inspired by the civilian system, the 
arguments in favour of drafting in such a style do not derive from 
any premises “ foreign” to the common law. Furthermore, in deter­
mining the generality of the drafting in a civilian jurisdiction the 
same kind of analysis must presumably also be undertaken.
Conclusion
The characteristics of the Evidence Code that are most 
frequently alluded to in asserting its compatibility with the common 
law - its comprehensiveness, the fact that it is pre-emptive of the 
preceding decisional law, and the generality of its drafting - were 
ascribed to the Code only after a careful analysis of the advantages 
and disadvantages of such attributes. They cannot be discredited 
simply by referring to them as foreign to the common law. The com­
mon law lawyer and the civilian lawyer may have different instincts, 
acquired through the socialization processes inherent in their 
respective systems, as to what a legislative enactment should look 
like. However, in the process of rational law reform the value of these 
instincts falls away. The law reformer must engage in a dispassion­
ate weighing of costs and benefits. If the end product looks more 
civilian than common law (or vice versa), so be it. The advantage we 
have in Canada is that the process of reform can draw on the experi­
ence of both systems of law. This advantage will hopefully not be lost 
because of narrow-minded provincialism.
